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3Kato might be dismissed as a spectacularly inept 
practitioner of public relations but he exemplifies a 
hardening of attitudes by Scaf. The repression of the 
protestors was the latest in a series of escalating attacks 
on Egypt’s revolutionaries by the 19 generals who make 
up Scaf, and who have wielded effective power in Egypt 
since Hosni Mubarak’s fall on 11 February 2011. The 
generals have adopted increasingly violent methods to 
combat challenges to their power, authorising the use 
of live ammunition and tear gas against protesters in 
Alexandria, Cairo and Aswan in April, May, July and 
September. On 15 May, the junta marked Nakba Day by 
permitting the firing of live rounds at a demonstration 
surrounding the Israeli embassy in Cairo which left at 
least 20 dead.
November 2011 proved to be one of Egypt’s bloodiest 
months with the army employing live ammunition and 
two types of potentially lethal tear gas in Tahrir Square 
against mass protests calling for Tantawi’s immediate 
resignation. The repression left 42 dead and hundreds 
injured and brought forth the following televised 
statement of intent from Scaf’s Major General Mukhtar 
el-Malla: ‘We will not relinquish power because a slogan-
chanting crowd said so.’4 
‘The army and the people – one hand’ was a key 
revolutionary slogan heard throughout Egypt during 
‘It is our opinion that if this revolution does not lead to 
the fair distribution of wealth it is not worth anything. 
Freedoms are not complete without social freedoms. 
The right to vote is naturally dependent on the right to 
a loaf of bread.’ – Declaration of Egyptian Independent 
Trade Unionists, Cairo, 19 February 2011 2  
On Monday 19 December 2011 the Egyptian newspaper 
Al Shorouk carried General Abdel Moneim Kato’s 
comments on protests outside the Cabinet offices in 
Cairo which demanded the end to the military rule of 
Egypt by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (Scaf), 
led by Field Marshal Mohammed Hussain Tantawi. 
Kato, a retired army officer who advises Scaf’s public 
relations department, dismissed the demonstrators 
as ‘delinquents’ in the pay of foreign governments, 
who ‘deserved to be thrown into Hitler’s ovens’. 
Kato’s pronouncements came after the army’s violent 
suppression of the protests, then into their third week. 
The action left 12 protestors dead and hundreds injured 
and culminated in a vicious attack on a woman protestor 
by three heavily armoured soldiers who stripped her of 
her abaya as they beat her unconscious. Video footage 
of this outrage shocked millions across the region. Kato 
justified the attack on the woman, popularly dubbed 
the ‘Blue bra girl’, on the grounds that she had been 
‘insulting the army through a megaphone.’3
In this Opinion, Sasha Simic, a long-standing democracy activist and trade unionist, argues that Egypt’s revolution 
of the 25 January 2011 was a response to years of neo-liberalism which have made a tiny elite there obscenely 
wealthy but which have impoverished the vast majority of its 85mn-strong population. The Egyptian masses, he 
argues, have achieved miracles in toppling Mubarak’s brutal dictatorship – a tyranny to which Western powers gave 
massive financial and military aid for 30 years – but the struggle cannot stop with Mubarak’s removal. The future of 
the revolution is now being contested between various forces. The current leadership of Egypt – the military rulers 
of Scaf (the Supreme Council of Armed Forces) – wants Egypt to continue on its neo-liberal path. For these leaders, 
the revolution is ‘over’. They want ‘Mubarakism without Mubarak’ and are increasingly prepared to use lethal force 
to maintain ‘order’. But the masses on the streets and in the factories and the fields want what free-market dogma 
has denied them – bread, work, land and a future worth living. The current world crisis has already discredited 
neo-liberalism in the eyes of many millions who are searching for a better way to live. The outcome of the Egyptian 
revolution will have world-changing implications. If the masses can build an Egypt which starts from the needs of 
the people rather than the requirements of the ‘market’ they will be mapping out a path millions of others will follow.
Simic argues that the key to the outcome of the revolution rests with Egypt’s enormous working class. The argument 
at the heart of his Opinion is simple: another world is both possible and necessary. A victorious Egyptian revolution 
could lay the foundations for that world.
Sasha Simic
Egypt’s revolution one year on – the overthrow 
of Hosni Mubarak was just the start1
4believed the military were ‘working to slow or reverse 
the gains of the revolution’.6
On Monday, 28 November 2011, while conflict between 
the military and their opponents was still being played 
out on the streets of Cairo, the Egyptian people began 
parliamentary elections in a process of bewildering 
complexity which took three months to complete. The 
elections for the lower house of parliament were being 
held on different dates across the country ending on the 
3 January 2012. The rules governing the elections were 
deliberately confusing and designed to exclude many 
who were at the heart of the 25 January revolution. 
There is a ban on political parties that are based on 
class or religion.7 Initial results indicate that the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the 
hard-line Islamists, the Salafists, have done well in 
the elections. But, whatever the outcome, the winners 
cannot form a government or select ministers. Power 
will remain with Scaf. The victors of the election will be 
allowed to form a consultative council which will draft a 
new constitution under which the next elections will be 
held in 2013. On 8 December 2011 Scaf announced 
that it, not the consultative council, would have the 
final say on the form of the new constitution.8 Given 
the paucity of the ‘democracy’ won by the masses 
so far, some commentators have argued that Egypt 
experienced a military coup rather than a true revolution 
in February 2011. This underestimates the scale of the 
achievement of the Egyptian people. Hosni Mubarak 
ran a brutal police state for 30 years. When Hillary 
Clinton came to Egypt as the US’s Secretary of State 
in February 2009, her officials handed her a document 
which gave the following précis of the Mubarak régime’s 
recent activities: 
Security forces used unwarranted lethal force and 
tortured and abused prisoners and detainees, in most 
cases with impunity … Security forces arbitrarily 
arrested and detained individuals, in some cases for 
political purposes, and kept them in prolonged pre-
trail detention. The executive branch placed limits 
on and pressured the judiciary. The government’s 
respect for freedoms of press, association, and 
religion declined during the year, and the government 
continued to restrict other civil liberties, particularly 
freedom of speech.9  
the 18-day struggle to end Mubarak’s dictatorship. 
The army have played a pivotal role in Egyptian politics 
since Nasser’s coup of 1952. They are perceived as 
guarantors of those vestiges of Nasser’s welfare reforms 
which have survived into the 21st century. There is also 
a very real organic connection between the army and 
the masses. Some 200,000 of the 500,000 soldiers 
that make up the Egyptian military are draftees. 
The army built up enormous reserves of goodwill during 
the revolution. Over 1,000 lives were lost and 3,000 
injured in the movement which ousted Mubarak but 
things could have been much worse. The Egyptian 
army is the tenth largest in the world. If it had chosen 
to move against the revolution, the death toll could 
have been enormous. But on 31 January 2011, six 
days into the uprising and on the eve of mass anti-
Mubarak demonstrations in Alexandria and Cairo, a 
military spokesman appeared on television to promise 
that the army ‘would not fire on protestors’ as they were 
‘legitimate’ and because ‘freedom of expression through 
peaceful means is guaranteed to everybody’.5 
This meant the struggle on the streets to depose 
Mubarak was fought out between revolutionaries and 
police. The army’s relative neutrality in January and 
February meant that few objected when Scaf took 
power in Egypt, following Mubarak’s resignation, on the 
promise that it would oversee a swift transition to civilian 
rule.
But in the period since the fall of Mubarak, Scaf has 
proved hostile to the democratic aspirations of the 
revolution. The state of emergency which has been 
in effect in Egypt since 1981, which bans strikes and 
protests, stands unchanged. Over 12,000 civilians have 
been arrested, detained and tried before military courts 
since the fall of Mubarak – more than were held over 
the 30 years of his dictatorship. Torture in prisons is as 
endemic as it was under Mubarak and it was not until 
December 2011 that the humiliating and degrading 
‘virginity tests’ that some women revolutionaries 
endured in detention was made illegal.
These measures, and the repeated postponement 
of civilian elections initially promised for September 
2011, have corroded the military’s reputation. A poll, 
conducted in Egypt in October 2011 by the University 
of Maryland, found 43 per cent of those questioned 
5engineering. This period saw multi-nationals stepping 
in to buy state-owned companies.11  The drive to neo-
liberalism also meant dispensing with price controls on 
food and other basic necessities. It meant hammering 
the poor and rewarding the rich. In 2004, for example, 
the rate of income tax for Egypt’s richest was slashed 
from 42 per cent to 20 per cent. In 2006 Mubarak 
amended the constitution, purging it of the last remnant 
of the welfare reforms introduced by Nasser’s régime. 
The changes were designed to ‘rid Egypt of socialist 
principles launched in the 1960s [to] create a favourable 
atmosphere for foreign investment.’12
This process was most obvious in agriculture. One of the 
most significant developments under Nasser was the 
expropriation of the landlords. The peasants in village 
collectives were given state loans to buy plots they had 
worked on for generations. It took the desperately poor 
peasants decades to pay off these loans. In 1992 the 
Egyptian parliament passed Law 96 which decreed that 
land should be returned to the owners of the pre-Nasser 
period. Entire villages were to be forcibly evicted from 
land they had spent decades buying from the state. The 
state – through cheap land concessions and priority 
access to water resources – also encouraged the 
establishment of private factory farms growing luxury 
foodstuffs such as grapes and strawberries for export 
to Europe. Over the last 20 years there have been two 
related trends in Egyptian agriculture: a 1,000 per cent 
increase in Egypt’s agricultural exports (worth in excess 
of $1bn in 2005); and, in the same period, between one 
to four million peasant farmers have been forced off 
their land and into the cities. Egypt is the world’s largest 
importer of wheat.13  
A few years ago neo-liberals were pointing to Egypt – 
the ‘tiger on the Nile’ – as a vindication of their doctrine. 
An IMF report published in 2008 ecstatically declared 
that the Egyptian economy ‘continues to impress’ 
attracting £11bn in foreign investment and boasting 
growth rates of 7.1 per cent. 
A tiny few became rich beyond imagination as a result of 
the changes. The combined wealth of Hosni Mubarak, 
his wife Suzanne and his two sons, Gamal and Alaa, on 
the cusp of the revolution is estimated to have been 
$70bn. The corrupt clique around Mubarak – the ‘one 
thousand families’ – amassed incredible fortunes. In the 
last weekend of January 2011, 19 private jets owned by 
Yet, without massive donations of financial and military 
aid from the West, Mubarak could not have survived 
to torment his people for 30 years. In that time the 
US alone gave the Egyptian state an annual donation 
of $1.5bn and additional donations of military aid. It 
has been estimated that the US subsidised Mubarak’s 
despotism to the tune of $64bn. Nor were they alone 
in their support for the regime: The Campaign against 
the Arms Trade has revealed that the UK sold Egypt 
£1.64mn-worth of weapons in 2009 alone, which 
included components for semi-automatic pistols and 
sub-machine guns, and arms sales from the EU to Egypt 
rose from €173mn in 2008 to €293mn in 2009.10 
In rising against Mubarak, the people of Egypt were not 
only challenging their own rulers, they were dealing a 
blow to imperialism in the region as well. But Western 
governments supported Mubarak for reasons that went 
beyond the strategic role he played in maintaining 
regional stability in the most economically important 
region of the planet. 
Hosni Mubarak was a champion of neo-liberal 
economics and his overthrow signalled the complete 
failure of neo-liberalism in the region. Under Nasser, the 
Egyptian economy underwent a shift to public ownership 
with the nationalisation of heavy industries such as iron 
and steel, cement and construction. By the early 1990s, 
the public sector dominated the economy accounting 
for 90 per cent of investment and 37 per cent of annual 
GDP [Gross Domestic Product]. In 1991, shortly after 
the collapse of the Stalinist dictatorships in Russia and 
Eastern Europe, Mubarak signed up to the ‘Washington 
consensus’ on free-market reforms for Egypt. In return 
for a loan of $7 bn from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Mubarak was obliged to restructure the Egyptian 
economy along neo-liberal lines, adopting policies 
that are now familiar guiding principles for economic 
development throughout the world. 
The programme of privatisation began with the passage 
of Law 203 in June 1991 which set a target of privatising 
314 public sector companies, with combined assets of 
£104bn, employing over a million staff. 
By June 2002, 190 of the targeted firms had been 
privatised. They included four cement companies 
– Beni Suef, Assiut, Alexandria and Torah Portland 
– and large concerns in textiles, manufacturing and 
6walkout lasted three months and was only won after 
5,000 tax collectors and their families staged an 11-day 
sit-in outside government offices in Tahrir Square. They 
won a 325 per cent increase in their salaries and the 
right to form the first independent union in Egypt since 
1957.
These seeds of resistance came to full flower in the 
Egyptian revolution. The Egyptian people rose against 
Mubarak because of what the neo-liberalism he 
championed had done to their lives.  But Scaf’s army 
chiefs are neo-liberals and businessmen and factory-
owners in their own right, with a considerable stake in 
the economic system built by Mubarak.
This explains the tension in Egyptian society since the 
fall of Mubarak and Scaf’s increasing use of violence. It 
is committed to maintaining an order which has failed 
the vast majority of the population. Samir Radwan, the 
finance minister appointed shortly after Mubarak’s 
removal, began his tenure with the promise that ‘our 
priority is to meet the demands of the people’ but he 
also insisted there would be ‘no change’ in economic 
policy.16 If Radwan couldn’t see a contradiction between 
these two statements, the Egyptian working-class 
could. Waves of strikes and protests for better working 
conditions followed Mubarak’s fall. They included railway 
workers and ambulance drivers; hundreds of workers 
at Telecom Egypt; 1,500 health workers in the public 
hospital in Kafr Al Zayat; 5,000 postal workers in Cairo; 
3,000 workers in the Cairo Public Transport Authority; 
and 24,000 workers at the Misr Spinning and Weaving 
textile factory in the Nile delta city of Al-Mahalla.
The animus driving the strikes was summed up by 
striking Cairo bus driver Mustafa Mohammed in 
February 2011: ‘We are immersed in debts. We are 
staying until our demands are met.’17
Workers have gone on to organise themselves into 25 
independent unions in manufacturing and industry; 28 
for clerical workers; 15 in transport; four in education; 
eight in the health sector; and three in post and 
telecommunications.18 
In March 2011 a strike wave by textile workers, bus 
drivers, tube operatives, postal workers and tourist 
officials involved 85,000 workers. In September 
750,000 workers, including airport staff, doctors and 
irrigation operatives, went on strike. They included 
Egypt’s richest families escaped from Cairo for Dubai. 
One contained Hussein Salem, a former intelligence 
officer close to Mubarak. Salem accumulated a personal 
fortune of $58.7bn under Mubarak through his interests 
in land, hotels and munitions. His involvement in a scam 
exporting gas to Israel at prices lower than production 
costs netted him profits of $2bn and cheated the 
Egyptian state of $714mn. He arrived in Dubai with 
$500mn in cash in his pockets.14 Salem is currently held 
in Spain and being tried in absentia by an Egyptian court 
for corruption. 
The Egyptian governments own Investment Authority 
exposed just how much of a mirage the Egyptian 
success story truly was when it reported in 2009 that 
90 per cent of its population had been untouched by 
the neo-liberal boom. That was not news to the vast 
majority of people trying to survive in the free-market 
paradise built by Mubarak. In 2007 – with food inflation 
spiralling at 17 per cent – there were food riots in 
several cities resulting in 11 deaths as crowds fought 
for access to state-subsidised bread. In 2000 the World 
Bank estimated 16 per cent of the population existed 
on less than $2 a day. By 2011 that number had grown 
to 40 per cent.15  
But there was widespread resistance to Mubarak’s 
neo-liberal onslaught. The revolution had its heralds. In 
the countryside peasants resisted the confiscation of 
their land. The Egyptian-based Land Centre for Human 
Rights estimates that between 1998 and 2000, 119 
were killed, 846 injured and 1,588 arrested in the 
struggle over land. Peasants slept in their fields to stop 
the military taking their plots. Sometimes they won and 
kept the landlords away. As one victorious peasant 
woman told the Cairo conference in 2008: ‘We are so 
poor we have nothing but our dignity and our scrap of 
land. If they come for it we’ll defend it. If you take our 
bread, we’ll break your neck.’ 
In the massive textile factories of the Nile Delta, workers 
repeatedly went on strike for higher pay and bonuses. In 
the autumn of 2007, for example, 27,000 workers at 
the giant Ghazl al-Mahalla textile plant north of Cairo 
walked out and won 130 days back-pay, improved 
transport to work, the removal of a corrupt official of the 
state union and the sack for a hated manager.
 In September 2008, 55,000 property tax collectors 
went on national strike for better conditions. Their bitter 
7For Scaf and its neo-liberal sympathisers, the revolution 
was ‘over’ with the fall of Mubarak. They want a soft 
landing for the revolution in which Egyptian society 
continues on its neo-liberal path – ‘Mubarakism’ 
without Mubarak. Their biggest success in this 
project was getting mass approval in March 2011 for 
the constitutional reforms under which December’s 
elections were conducted. Fourteen million took part 
in the referendum and 77 per cent voted in favour of 
the amendments, which are confusing, anti-democratic 
and designed to exclude authentic working-class and 
peasant representation. The constitution’s insistence 
that Islam is the state religion of Egypt won it the support 
of The Muslim Brotherhood, who then won approval for 
it among their supporters. The Muslim Brotherhood 
under Mubarak had a clandestine membership of two 
million people who came under its direction in some 
sense. However, they are not a monolithic organisation 
and, though their leadership is conservative and market-
orientated with much in common with the ruling-order, 
their base shares the general poverty of the masses. 
Consequently, the Brotherhood has experienced a 
number of splits since the 25 January revolution. At the 
time of writing it’s clear that The Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party has done well in the 
elections. But their victory will not signal that the 
revolution is ‘over’. The Parliament that comes out of 
the elections will be very weak and reliant on Scaf. In 
addition the Freedom and Justice Party is pro-business 
and offers the masses little by way of change.  
The revolution is far from ‘over’. For all the repressive 
powers at Tantawi’s disposal, the Egyptian masses 
have won, and continue to win, amazing victories. It 
was the power of the Egyptian ‘street’ which forced 
the government into opening the Rafah crossing on 
the Egyptian-Gaza border in June. It also ensured the 
government could not guarantee to Israel that it would 
continue to be supplied with cheap Egyptian gas.  In 
August, Hosni Mubarak himself was hauled before 
an Egyptian court on his sick-bed to begin his trial on 
charges of murder and corruption. The ruling-order 
would have preferred Mubarak to die quietly in Sharm el-
Sheikh but they were forced to begin his televised trial 
– and the trial of his two sons – through the pressure of 
street protests throughout the country.
In addition, those who would have the revolution ‘over’ 
must deal with the continued existence of the popular 
26,000 sugar refinery workers and 40,000 teachers, 
whose banners read ‘Meet our demands or no school 
this year’. It is estimated half-a-million Egyptian workers 
went on strike between late September and mid-
October 2011.19   
Their demands were not just for higher pay – although low 
pay is endemic. In 2008 junior doctors unsuccessfully 
campaigned for 1,000 Egyptian pounds (£100 sterling) 
a month as a professional minimum.  The Egyptian 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions has demanded 
a minimum monthly wage of 1,200 Egyptian pounds 
while the government has only agreed – in principle – 
to 700. But workers have demanded both economic 
and political changes. They have called for the end to 
temporary employment contracts ubiquitous throughout 
Egyptian workplaces. They have demanded a higher tax 
rate for the wealthy and, in addition to a minimum wage 
for workers, a maximum wage for their bosses. Workers 
and students have also begun the process of expelling 
the ‘little Mubaraks’ from factories, offices, hospitals 
and schools. The ‘little Mubaraks’ are both the political 
overseers from Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, 
who were commonplace throughout Egyptian society 
prior to the revolution, or just obnoxious managers who 
have abused their authority.
  The workers’ movement has been resisted by Scaf 
and conservative forces since the overthrow of 
Mubarak. Only days after assuming power, Scaf issued 
‘Communiqué No 5’ urging Labour leaders to call off 
strikes. As doctors and policemen marched in Cairo for 
better terms and working conditions, state television 
characterised strikers as ‘selfish’ contrasting the unity 
of Tahrir Square with workers’ sectional demands : 
’Some government institutions have staged protests 
despite life returning to normal at a time when all 
citizens should stand together. Honourable citizens can 
see that protests at this critical time will have a negative 
effect in harming the security of the country.’20 The 
argument that ‘we’re all in this together’ has often been 
used by the opponents of the workers’ movement since 
February.
The struggle within the Egyptian revolution – that is, 
who gets to decide when a revolution is over – has been 
at the centre of every revolution over the last 200 years 
of world history. 
8committees. These were created during the January 
uprising to protect state property like the library at 
Alexandria and the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. Popular 
committees were also formed in urban communities 
across Egypt to protect neighbourhoods and to ensure 
milk and food supplies. Three networks of popular 
committees continue to function, organising counter-
demonstrations to abuses by the authorities.
At the end of 2011 came news which guaranteed, like it 
or not, that the revolution is far from ‘over’. As inflation, 
pushed by spiralling food prices, touched 10.4 per cent, 
Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri gave notice of plans 
to reduce public spending by $3.3bn. This was followed 
by finance minister Momtaz el-Saeed’s announcement 
that he was imposing a 10 per cent cut on the bonuses 
of government employees. The government of Egypt 
is telling its people, 40 per cent of whom live on less 
than $2 a day, that they must accept an austerity 
programme.21
The Egyptian revolution is not the work of a day; it is 
a process which has not finished and an event of 
worldwide significance. It has scared the right people. 
In February 2011, 45 socialists were arrested in 
Zimbabwe for showing a video about the Egyptian and 
Tunisian revolutions. The 45 were originally charged 
with treason and faced the death penalty. Most of them 
were released, following an international campaign 
against their arrest, but Munyaradzi Gwisai, Tafadzwa 
Choto, Tatenda Mombeyarara, Edson Chakuma, 
Hopewell Gumbo and Welcome Zimuto are currently on 
trial charged with ‘conspiracy to commit public violence’ 
and face the prospect of 20 years in jail for watching 
a video about Mubarak’s fall. Despots understand the 
potent lesson behind the Arab Spring.
The Egyptian revolution has also shamed and exposed 
the right people. In February 2011 the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron made a stop-over in Cairo and 
visited Tahrir Square in support of the revolution. In an 
address to the Kuwaiti Parliament, Cameron was full of 
praise for the ‘brave and peaceful’ protestors ‘hungry 
for political and economic freedom’. He also insisted 
that ‘Violence is never the answer to people’s legitimate 
aspirations.’22 But Cameron made these comments in 
the context of a three-day tour of the Gulf States aimed 
at increasing British arms sales in the region. He was 
accompanied by a 36-strong team of salesmen which 
included representatives from what is delicately termed 
the defence industry such as BAE Systems, Rolls Royce 
and the Cobham Group. The UK leads the world in sales 
to the Middle East and the Gulf States of fighter-jets, 
sub-machine guns, electric batons and tear gas. 
The Egyptian revolution has also inspired millions 
across the world. The tens of thousands of public 
sector workers who took to the streets of Madison, 
Wisconsin in defence of trade union rights were 
galvanised by the Egyptian revolution. The OCCUPY 
movement, which has mobilised millions across the 
planet against the systematic inequality of capitalism, 
drew inspiration from the achievements of the Egyptian 
people. In overthrowing Mubarak and challenging the 
logic of a system that produced Mubarak, the Egyptian 
masses have given the world a glimpse of a political and 
economic alternative that orthodox economists deny 
exists. They have put revolutionary change back on the 
political agenda. 
Victory is far from assured. Tantawi and his cronies 
may well continue to dictate Egypt’s future and subject 
its people to still more neo-liberalism, inequality and 
poverty. But there is a chance that the spirit behind the 
still-growing workers movement can take the Egyptian 
people down a better path. In doing so, they will light the 
way for others looking for a better way to live.
The working people and poor of Egypt know what is at 
stake. In June 2011, I attended a meeting of the newly 
formed Democratic Workers Party (DWP) in Giza. It 
was made up of activists from many industries, who 
had all been at the centre of events in January and who 
were driving the flourishing independent trade-union 
movement in their respective industries.
They were debating their prospects in the elections 
and some were bewailing the fact that The Muslim 
Brotherhood were likely to do well – especially, 
someone noted, in the rural areas where the workers 
were ‘backward and sectarian’. One middle-aged man 
from the Brickmakers’ Union gave an answer to that:   
I’d like to respond to the argument that the poor  in 
the towns and countryside are more reactionary and 
backward than the workers in the cities. I come from 
Atfih in Helwan. It’s true that there has been sectarian 
9violence there recently between Muslims and Copts. A 
church was set on fire ... It’s also likely that the Muslim 
Brotherhood will do well there but only because they 
provide a welfare structure for the desperately poor 
which the state won’t. Yet people want something 
better. I began work in a brick factory at the age of 5 
That’s very common. Parents are still forced to send 
children as young as 4 or 5 to work there. They have 
no other option. But despite this, Atfih never voted for 
Mubarak. Despite his gerrymandering we never gave 
him our mandate. So don’t tell me that the country-
people are instinctively reactionary. If the DWP could 
show the poor in places like Atfih an alternative to 
poverty or charity, if we could point the way to a future 
where child labour is a memory, we would get the 
support of the people in the countryside.
This is the challenge to which the workers’ movement in 
Egypt must rise.
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are people who were at the centre of events, the living and breathing revolution:
Ahmad Kamal Salah, Meteorological Office employee; Hossam Muhammad Abdallah Ali, health 
technicians; Sayyida Al-Sayyid Muhammad Fayiz, nurse; Ashraf Abd al-Wanis, Al-Fayyum Sugar Refinery; 
Abd-al-Qadir Mansur, Umar Effendi Department Store; Hafiz Nagib Muhammad, Future Pipes Company, 
6th October City; Muhammad Hassan, Egypt – Helwan Textiles Company; Mahmud Abd-al-Munsaf Al-
Alwani, Tura Cement; Ali Mahmud Nagi, Egyptian Commercial Pharmaceutical Company; Umar Muhammad 
Abd-al-Aziz, Hawamidiyya Sugar Refinery; Muhammad Galal, Egyptian Pharmaceuticals; Shazli Sawi 
Shazli, Suez Fertilisers Company; Muhammad Ibrahim Hassan, Military Factory No. 45; Wasif Musa Wahba, 
Military Factory No. 999; Gamil Fathi Hifni, General Transport Authority; Adil Abd-al-Na’im, Cairo General 
Contractors; Ali Hassan Abu Aita, Al-Qanah Rope Co., Port Sa’id; Hind Abd-al-Gawad Ibrahim, Information 
Centre; Hamada Abu-Zaid, Information Centre; Muhammad Khairy Zaid, Information Centre; Hatim Salah 
Sayyid, General Authority for Cultural Centres; Muhammad Abd-al-Hakim, National Postal Authority; Ahmad 
Islam, International Ibex Company; Tariq Sayyid Mahmud, Military Factory 99; Nabil Mahmud, Military Factory 
999; Mahmud Shukri, trade unionist; Ahmad Faruq, Military Factory 999; Usama Al-Sayyid, Military Factory 
999; Yasir Al-Sayyid Ibrahim, Future Pipe Industries; Mahmud Ali Ahmad, tannery workers; Abd-al-Rasul 
Abd-al-Ghani, future workers; Ali Al-Sayyid Umar, Effendi Department Store; Kamal Abu Aita, property tax 
collectors (RETAU); Ahmad Abd-al-Sabur, property tax collectors (RETAU); Salah Abd-al-Hamid, property 
tax collectors (RETAU); Mahmud Umar, property tax collectors (RETAU); Khalid Galal Muhammad, worker 
Muhammad Zaki Isma’il, Petrotrade Company.
Maximise your membership
The CA/B can help your country make the 
most of Commonwealth membership for 
maximum impact at home and abroad.
We offer
Strategic advice — we identify opportunities 
in the Commonwealth calendar to champion 
your national and regional priorities and 
provide political and media advice on how to 
do so effectively
Training — we design and run introductory 
courses for government officials on the 
modern Commonwealth and contemporary 
Commonwealth issues
Materials — we provide speechwriting 
services for Heads of Government, Ministers 
and senior officials on Commonwealth 
and international issues to increase 
effectiveness in international fora, during bi-
lateral visits and on Commonwealth Day. We 
also provide fact sheets and web content
A gateway to the Commonwealth family — 
we can help you navigate the 90+
Commonwealth institutions and 
organisations and help you access their 
advice and assistance
CA/B
Expert knowledge — we have a hand-
selected team of expert speechwriters, 
senior political advisors, experienced 
trainers and media professionals
Impact — as the only think tank focusing 
solely on the modern Commonwealth 
we have unique influence and impact in 
Commonwealth circles
Strategy — the CA/B follows the 
Commonwealth agenda closely and 
has strong working partnerships with 
Commonwealth institutions and civil society 
organisations
Tailored packages — we provide tailored 
packages, materials and support to suit your 
needs
Affordable — as a not-for-profit unit we 
provide an affordable service
For more information please contact
Ms Daisy Cooper
Director, Commonwealth Advisory Bureau





Tel: +44 (0)20 7862 8865
Email: CAB@sas.ac.uk
Web: www.commonwealthadvisorybureau.org
Independent Advisory Services for the Modern Commonwealth
About the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau
The Commonwealth Advisory Bureau is the independent think-tank and advisory service for the 
modern Commonwealth of fifty-four nations and nearly two billion citizens. We specialise in issues 
of Commonwealth policy including globalisation, democracy, civil society and human rights.
Part of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, we run projects in countries 
across the Commonwealth. We produce quality policy-relevant reports and briefings to inform and 
influence policy makers in over a quarter of the world’s countries. We seek to put the policy choices 
before the Commonwealth into sharper focus, exploring options and suggesting new directions. 
CA/B projects are changing the way people think on issues such as making elections fairer, 
recognising the needs of indigenous peoples and assisting development in small island states. We 
are committed to continuing our work to inform and improve policy and decision making across 
the Commonwealth.
We also offer confidential and impartial advice to countries interested in applying to join the 
Commonwealth, and can help existing member countries make the most of Commonwealth 
membership for maximum impact at home and abroad.
About the Opinions Series
CA/B Opinions are authored opinion pieces and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CA/B. 
The purpose of the publication series is to stimulate debate and dialogue around some of the most 
pressing issues in the Commonwealth.
